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CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 




Corporations are frequently treated as “persons” under the law.  One of 
the fundamental questions associated with this treatment is whether 
corporations should receive the same Constitutional protections and guarantees 
as natural persons.  In particular, should corporations receive the Constitutional 
protections of Criminal Procedure?  After all, corporations cannot be sent to jail 
so the sanctions they face are essentially the same as in civil proceedings.  If so, 
then why not have the same procedural protections for corporate defendants in 
civil and criminal cases?  Little scholarly analysis has focused on this issue from 
an economic perspective and this article aims to fill that gap.  
 
My analysis concludes that the concerns animating most procedural 
protections in the corporate context (i.e., reducing the costs of adjudicative errors 
and abusive prosecutorial behavior) would require procedural protections that 
differ for corporate defendants depending on the identity of the moving party 
(e.g., government or private litigant), and the type of sanction the corporation is 
facing, but not on the type of proceedings (criminal or civil) against the 
corporation.  The analysis thus calls for a reorientation of procedural protections 
for corporate defendants along these lines rather than on the current criminal – 
civil dichotomy.  The implications of such a reorientation are sketched in this 
paper and may, at times, suggest having stronger protections for corporations in 
civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings. 
                                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law; S.J.D. Harvard Law School, 1997.  Email: 
vskhanna@umich.edu or vskhanna2004@yahoo.com.  
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CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
By: Vikramaditya S. Khanna† 
 





The frequent treatment of corporations as “persons” under the law raises 
a number of fundamental questions.1  One such question is whether corporations 
should receive the same Constitutional protections and guarantees as natural 
persons.  Although a corporation’s claim to the First Amendment has received 
considerable attention,2 much less scholarly attention has been focused on 
whether a corporation should receive the Constitutional protections of Criminal 
Procedure, such as double jeopardy or the reasonable doubt standard.3   After all, 
                                                                 
† Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law; S.J.D. Harvard Law School, 1997.  Email: 
vskhanna@umich.edu or vskhanna2004@yahoo.com. I would like to thank the John M. Olin Foundation for 
funding support and Rick Bierschbach, Jill Fisch, Michael Heller, Keith Hylton, Avery Katz, Mitch Polinsky, 
Steven Shavell, Steven Thel, and participants at seminars at the University of Michigan Law School, 
Stanford Law School, Fordham Law School, and  ____ for helpful comments and discussion.  I would also 
like to thank Caitlyn Campbell, Nathan Howell, Kristin Jenkins, Jay Krawitz, Philip Maxwell, George Qi, 
Mike Silberfarb, Steve Weaver, and Natalie Wong-Brink for excellent research assistance.  
1 See, e.g, John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in 
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 
1987); Warren J. Samuels, The Idea of the Corporation as a Person: On the Normative Significance of Judicial 
Language, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 113 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. 
Miller eds., 1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH.  L. REV. 386 (1981); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 217 – 18 (1988); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1492 (1996)[hereinafter Liability]; V.S. Khanna, 
Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 
(1999)[hereinafter Corporate Fault]; William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 648 
(1994); Steven D. Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and 
Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991).  Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds:  The Shift from Individual 
to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L.  REV. 1473, 1529 (1986).    
2 See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commerical Speech, 48 UCLA L.  REV. 1 (2000); 
Ronald A. Cass, Commerical Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1988; Martin H. Redish, 
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).  Much of the campaign finance literature also entails 
some discussion of the corporation’s first amendment rights. [collecting cites]. 
3 The economically oriented discussion of corporate procedural protections is usually a few pages in 
an article that mainly deals with other issues.  See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1495 – 96; John T. Byam, 
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corporations cannot be sent to jail so the sanctions they face are essentially the 
same as those in civil proceedings.  If so, then why not have the same procedural 
protections for corporate defendants in civil and criminal cases? This article 
examines these questions from an economic perspective. 
 
Addressing these questions is important not only for their intrinsic value, 
but also because they may help shed some light on the desirability and efficacy 
of corporate criminal liability.  This is because the primary, and perhaps only, 
substantive differences between corporate criminal liability and corporate civil 
liability are the procedural protections that apply to them.4  Although these 
differences have persisted for years, there is little economically-oriented 
discussion of their desirability.5  Specifically, there is little analysis of whether 
these procedural protections are desirable for corporations or whether having 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Comment, The Economic Efficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73  J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582  (1982); 
Developments, supra note 4, at  1365-75.   There is more discussion of corporate procedural protections from 
other perspectives.  See, e.g., Howard Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER 174 (1979); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability:  Seeking 
a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN.  L. REV. 793 
(1996); Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Private Corporations: 
An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2002); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393, 429 – 30 (1995); Scott Trainor, A Comparative Analysis of Corporation’s Right 
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2139, 2140 (1995); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: 
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 557 (1990).   See also JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 788 – 862, 1008 – 44 (2001). 
4 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1492 (1996); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime 
Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U.L. Q. 95 (2004)[hereinafter Political Economy]; 
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Politics & Corporate Crime Legislation , 27 REGULATION 30 (Spring 2004)[hereinafter 
Politics]; Friedman, supra note 3; Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions to 
Regulate Corporate Behavior , 92 HARV. L.  REV. 1227, 1230 (1979) [hereinafter Developments].  For discussion of 
corporate criminal liability see generally KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2d ed., 1992); 
O’SULLIVAN, supra note 3; JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER,  CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 975 – 1013 (4th ed., 2000). 
5 The economically oriented discussion of corporate procedural protections is usually a few pages in 
an article that mainly deals with other issues.  See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1495 – 96; John T. Byam, 
Comment, The Economic Efficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73  J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582  (1982); 
Developments, supra note 4, at  1365-75.  There is more discussion of procedural protections for individual 
defendants from an economic perspective.  See RICHARD A. POSNER,  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 604 – 
05 (discussing one economic justification for criminal procedure), 748 (noting that searches and seizures 
generate social costs) (5th ed. 1998); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. 
U.L. REV. 387, 451  (1996) (finding criminal suspects less likely to confess after Miranda); John J. Donohue III, 
Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1998);  Keith N. Hylton & V.S. Khanna, 
A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, Discussion Paper No. 318, John M. Olin Center for Law, 
4
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different procedural protections for corporations depending on the type of 
liability proceedings – criminal or civil – is desirable.  
 
My analysis concludes that the concerns animating most procedural 
protections in the corporate context (e.g., reducing the costs of adjudicative 
errors and abusive prosecutorial behavior) would require procedural protections 
for corporate defendants that differ depending on the identity of the moving 
party (e.g., government or private litigant), and the type of sanction the 
corporation is facing, but not on the type of proceedings (criminal or civil) against 
the corporation.  The analysis thus calls for a reorientation of procedural 
protections for corporate defendants along these lines rather than on the current 
criminal – civil dichotomy.  The implications of such a reorientation are sketched 
out in later parts of this article and may involve providing corporations with 
stronger protections in some civil proceedings than criminal proceedings.   
 
Part II begins by describing the major procedural protections of interest to 
my analysis.  These include the beyond reasonable standard of proof, double 
jeopardy, right to a jury trial, fourth amendment protection, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. These protections create a pro-defendant bias in 
criminal proceedings and it becomes important to examine what might justify 
this bias.  
 
Part III notes that the literature identifies a number of potential 
justifications including (i) protecting the defendant’s privacy interests and liberty 
interests against unwarranted government intrusion, (ii) reducing the costs 
associated with adjudicative error (error costs) and (iii) reducing the costs 
associated with abusive prosecutorial behavior (rent-seeking or improper 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Economics & Business, Harvard Law School (2001)(revised 2004), 2001 version available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/; 2004 version available from authors upon request.  
5
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enforcement costs).6  Although these are clearly important goals, only the last 
two apply in the corporate context.  This is because corporations do not possess 
the same kinds of liberty and privacy interests as humans do.7  Part III then 
elaborates the error cost justification in the context of individual defendants and 
suggests that the social sanctioning costs associated with wrongful imprisonment 
may provide a good partial justification for the pro-defendant bias in criminal 
procedure.   
 
Part IV then examines the error cost justification in the context of 
corporate defendants.  Because corporations cannot be sent to jail the primary 
error cost justification for criminal protections is weaker.8  Indeed, corporations 
face the same kinds of sanctions in criminal and civil proceedings (only monetary 
ones) suggesting little need, on error cost grounds, to have different procedures 
based on the kind of proceedings.  However, not all monetary sanctions have the 
same error costs. Indeed, certain sanctions, such as loss of license sanctions, 
punitive damages, and other large sanctions imposed under uncertain legal 
standards, may have greater social costs than simple cash fines regardless of 
whether these sanctions are imposed in criminal or civil proceedings. These greater 
social costs may justify some departure from the civil procedural protections, but 
perhaps not all the way to the criminal protections. 9   This is because the social 
sanctioning costs of a wrongful loss of license or punitive damages sanction are 
                                                                 
6 See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  114 – 127 
(8th ed., 1994)[more recent edition]; Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5.  One 
could also list constraining litigation costs as a justification for these procedural protections.  See Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administraion, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 447 (1973).   I 
do not because the analysis relevant for litigation costs can be quite complex and is best left to another 
paper.  Moreover, most of the discussion of procedural protections does not necessarily suggest the 
reduction of litigation costs as the primary justification(s).  [collecting cites] 
7 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95.  [collect more cites] 
8 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 604 – 05 (discussing the error cost justification); JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , (2d ed. 1997) (describing justifications for pro-defendant bias); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial Analysis and Reform, UTAH L. REV. 67, 68  
(1992).  
9 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1497 – 1512. 
6
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 29 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art29
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure:  
An Economic Analysis, Draft 
5 
 
probably not as large as the social sanctioning costs of wrongful imprisonment.10  
Thus, on error cost grounds, we would be inclined to provide corporations with 
protections that vary with the type of sanction (not type of proceedings), but the 
highest protection would be less than the criminal protections for individual 
defendants.   
 
Part V then moves on to discuss the costs of improper or abusive 
enforcement and how they might justify a pro-defendant bias in criminal 
procedure when dealing with individual defendants.  In essence, the pro-
defendant protections make it harder for prosecutors, and those who might 
lobby them, to use the law enforcement process to benefit themselves or extract 
wealth from others. 11    
 
Part VI then examines improper enforcement costs in the corporate 
context.  As a general matter, these costs are probably quite large in the corporate 
context.  This is because the gains from abusive or improper enforcement are 
likely to be greater when there is a corporate defendant because it has more 
wealth to be expropriated than most individual defendants.12  Moreover, in the 
corporate context the improper enforcement concerns may be greater in 
government civil enforcement than criminal enforcement because civil 
enforcement is more frequent, possesses larger sanctions, and is enforced by 
government agencies that are more easily “captured” than the agencies that 
                                                                 
10 See id.  When sanctioning costs are between the civil and criminal extremes some have suggested 
relying on intermediate or hybrid standards.  See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground 
Between Criminal and Civil Law , 101 YALE L . J. 1795,  1813 (1992) (discussing hybrid liability structures for 
individual defendants). 
11 Improper enforcement concerns may arise in private litigation too (e.g., frivolous litigation), but 
the methods of dealing with frivolous litigation in private enforcement are difficult to transport to criminal 
enforcement brought by the government.  See infra discussion Part V.  Cf. also Eric Talley, et al, A Theory of 
Legal Presumptions, 16 J. L. ECON.  & ORG. 1 (2000). See generally, Developments in the Law--Lawyers' 
Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547 (1994); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced 
Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation:  A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP.  L. 
REV.  1067, 1075 (1994). 
12 See infra discussion in Part VI.C. 
7
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enforce the criminal law.  Thus, on improper enforcement cost grounds, we 
would be inclined to provide corporate defendants with potentially stronger 
protections in some government civil proceedings than criminal proceedings.   
 
Part VII takes this analysis and examines its implications for procedural 
protections as applied to corporations.  The analysis generally suggests weaker 
protections for corporate defendants than individual defendants, but similar 
protections for corporate defendants in criminal and civil proceedings.  To the 
extent there is a difference in protections between criminal and civil proceedings 
for corporate defendants it may cut in favor of stronger protections in some civil 
cases than criminal cases.  The net impact of this analysis on the overall mix of 
procedural protections is sketched out in this Part.  Part VIII then discusses some 
special evidentiary concerns with certain procedural protections and Part IX 
concludes. 
 
II. CORPORATE PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
 Procedural protections cover a vast area of jurisprudence that spawns an 
impressive amount of discussion.13  I cannot hope to cover every aspect of it in 
this paper.  Consequently, I narrow my focus to those procedural protections 
that differ for corporate and individual defendants and those procedural 
protections that differ for corporations depending on the type of proceedings 
they are facing.   It is these differences that I am interested in examining. 
 
 
                                                                 
13 See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2000); SUSAN N. SUBRIN, ET AL. CIVIL 
PROCEDURE DOCTRINE : PRACTICE , AND CONTEXT 643 –  46 (2000); Paul Hoffman, The Rodney King Trials: Civil 
Rights Prosecutions & Double Jeopardy: Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights “Exception”, 41 UCLA L.  
REV. 649 (1994); Robert Bartels, The Hearsay Rule, The Confrontation Clause, and Reversible Error in Criminal 
Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 967 (1994); Susan R. Klein, Special Issue, Reducing the Criminal Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF.  
CRIM. L. REV. 697 (1999). 
8
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A. Standard of Proof. 
 
In criminal proceedings corporate defendants receive the benefits of the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof.14  This stands in contrast to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard commonly used in civil proceedings.15  
It appears that the reasonable doubt standard is much more pro-defendant than 
the preponderance standard.16  Simply put, the moving party has a greater 
burden in corporate criminal proceedings compared to corporate civil 
proceedings.17  
 
B. Rules on Retrials. 
 
In both civil and criminal proceedings there is the possibility of retrial and 
each area has rules governing this.  In the criminal context double jeopardy and 
collateral estoppel can be used to prevent retrials or to make the issues in a 
potential retrial moot.18  In the civil context res judicata and collateral estoppel 
apply with somewhat similar effect.19  Corporate defendants receive double 
jeopardy and collateral estoppel in criminal cases and res judicata and collateral 
estoppel in civil cases. 20  As collateral estoppel applies in both types of cases the 
                                                                 
14 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1341 – 50. 
15 See Hylton and Khanna, supra note 5, at 5; Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil 
Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 
HASTINGS L.J.  1325, 1394  (1991) 
16 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 4 – 5.  But see Irwin A. Horowitz, Reasonable Doubt 
Instructions: Commonsense Justice and Standard of Proof, 3 PSYCHOL . PUB. POL'Y & L. 285,  295 (noting “reasonable 
doubt” does not have a uniform interpretation among jurors) (1997).   
17 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1512.  See also Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 5 (noting 
that “the preponderance rule is assumed to require that the decision-maker be 51% certain that the 
defendant is liable… whereas the reasonable doubt standard [assumes] that the decision-maker [is] 90% to 
95% certain [of liability].”) 
18 See Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Double Jeopardy, 91 GEO. J. L. 409 –  52; DRESSLER, 
supra note 8, at 687 – 95.  
19 See SUBRIN, supra note 13, at 883 – 911. 
20 Double Jeopardy protection applies to corporations in criminal proceedings.  See Developments, 
supra note 4, at 1341 - 44; RICHARD S.  GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING  §§ 5.031M, 5.7.11 (1994); 
Friedman, supra note 3, at 195 – 98 (1979); United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 F.2D 584, 588 
(6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alder Creek Water Co., 823 F.2D 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1987). 
9
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differences in protection depend on the differences between res judicata and 
double jeopardy. 21   
 
One difference is in the availability of an appeal right.  Under res judicata 
either party can appeal an initial trial outcome, 22 whereas under double jeopardy 
normally only the defense can appeal the outcome in an initial trial. 23  Another 
difference is that res judicata applies once there is a final decision on the merits, 
whereas double jeopardy often applies much earlier. 24   In other words, if a civil 
trial ends without a verdict then that is not a reason to prohibit a second civil 
trial under res judicata, whereas in criminal cases double jeopardy prohibits a 
second criminal trial once the defendant is “in jeopardy”, which could be well 
before a final verdict.25  This suggests that double jeopardy is more pro-
defendant than res judicata and that the protection against retrials is stronger in 
criminal cases.   
 
This, however, ignores some instances where res judicata might actually 
be stronger than double jeopardy in protecting against retrials.26  Generally, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
For discussion of the protections for corporate defendants in civil proceedings see Developments, 
supra note 4, at 1349 – 60; Richard Gruner, Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate 
Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 407, 432  (1994). 
21 See Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal Collateral Estoppel and the Use of 
Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 290 – 91 (1992) (discussing difference between double jeopardy 
and collateral estoppel doctrines); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL ., MOORE 'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 132.01[4][a] (3d 
ed. 1998) (comparing res judicata and collateral estoppel); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 26(1)(f) 
(1980) (claim preclusion), 28(5)(c) (issue preclusion); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 256, 567, 1312 – 13 (7th ed., 
1999).  
22 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1343; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric 
Appeals Rights: What Purpose Do They Serve?, 82 B.U.L.REV. 341, 344 (2002). 
23 See Khanna, supra note 22, at 344; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904) (holding that 
the government may not appeal an acquittal); 430 U.S. 564, 567 (1977).  This rule does apply to corporations 
according to United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. 430 U.S. 564, 567 (1977).   
24 See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 687 – 88 (discussing double jeopardy); SUBRIN ET. AL, supra note 13, 
at 887 – 89 (discussing res judicata); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (elaborating on when “jeopardy” 
attaches).  
25 See Crist, supra note 24.  Discussion of the double jeopardy treatments of mistrials can be gleaned 
from see Stephen Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449 (1977).  Here also there is some 
possibility that there will not be another trial.  See id., at 468 – 69. 
26 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1343; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 26; Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)(defining what “same” offense means for double jeopardy purposes).  
10
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under res judicata when you have the same parties in litigation the courts will 
prefer to have claim joinder so that all the issues/claims can be heard in one trial 
when dealing with the same sets of facts.27  Double jeopardy, however, does not 
require that all offenses based on the same set of facts be heard in one trial.28  
There can simply be no further trials for the same offense, but there can be further 
trials for different offenses based on the same set of facts.29  To see this difference 
imagine that there are two offenses – one with elements A,B, and C and the other 
with elements A,B, and E – arising from the same set of facts and involving the 
same parties.  If these were civil wrongs res judicata would require that they be 
argued in one trial.30  If these were criminal wrongs then there is a greater chance 
that double jeopardy jurisprudence would allow the prosecution to bring two 
trials.  This is because “[t]wo offenses are different for double jeopardy purposes 
whenever each contains an element that the other does not.”31  Thus, it may 
actually be easier to obtain a retrial in criminal cases because of the definition of 
same offense within double jeopardy.     
 
Although true in the abstract, there are reasons to believe that double 
jeopardy’s ease of permitting retrials for different offenses on the same set of 
facts is more illusory than real.  Many states will not permit prosecutors to split 
charges based on the same set of facts so that although the Constitutional 
protection of double jeopardy may permit charge-splitting few states would 
                                                                 
27 See E. William Stockmeyer, Symposium Note, Res Judicata Effects of Unappealed, Independently 
Sufficient Alternative Determinations, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 723 (1985) (res judicata has goal of “full and 
fair” litigation); Walter W. Heiser, California’s Confusing Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN 
DIEGO L.  REV. 509, 512 (1998) (noting function of a successful res judicata doctrine is finality); Massari v. 
Einsiedler, 78 A.2d 572, 574 (1951) (arguing that res judicata’s purpose is to conclusively determine issues). 
28 See Randall, supra note 21, at 290 – 91; Judge Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining 
Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 435  (1999). 
29 See Blockburger, supra note 26, at 299 (1932)(holding that prosecution of different offenses arising 
from the same set of facts might not be prevented under double jeopardy protection). 
30 See Stockmeyer, supra note 27; Heiser, supra note 27. 
31 Lewis v. U.S. 523 U.S. 155, 176 (1998).  See also Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 255, 260 (2000). 
11
Khanna:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure:  
An Economic Analysis, Draft 
10 
 
allow it.32  Also, prosecutors might have little incentive to pursue later trials 
based on the same facts because the factual holdings in the first criminal trial 
may have collateral estoppel effects on later trials.33  Moreover, prosecutors faced 
with a budget constraint might not find it in their interests to pursue a retrial 
when the first trial was unsuccessful.34  The acquittal in the first trial may 
provide a signal that the likelihood of success in another trial is bleak.  
 
Thus, overall double jeopardy may have a greater pro-defendant bias than 
res judicata given asymmetric appeal rights and the timing of when jeopardy 
attaches.  This suggests that in terms of protection against retrials there is a 
greater pro-defendant bias in criminal cases. 
 
C. Right to a Jury Trial. 
 
A number of federal courts have held that a corporation has the right to a 
jury trial for wrongdoing that is not considered “petty”.35   The US Supreme 
Court has not yet affirmatively decided the issue, but the lower courts appear to 
agree that corporations do have a right to a jury trial in such criminal cases.36  A 
similar right does not appear to exist in civil proceedings.37          
                                                                 
32 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex 
Criminal Cases:  A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 100  (1992) (suggesting some legislatures constrict the state’s 
prosecutors’ ability to reprosecute cases eligible for double jeopardy protection); Khanna, supra note 22, at 
394 n. 204; Elizabeth R. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution Phenomenon in the Federal System, 85 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 525, 554 n. 175 (1995)(noting that 23 states have, by statute, barred charge splitting).  
33 See Gertner, supra note 28, at 435 – 36; United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466, 469 (3d Cir. 1943) 
(holding that jury could not reconsider certain pre-litigated findings of fact upon which the defendant’s 
prior acquittal was based). 
34 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Method of Error Correction , 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 383 – 
85 (1995).  Also, in countries where prosecutors can appeal acquittals we see very few prosecutorial appeals 
probably for the reasons identified in the text.  See Khanna, supra note 22, at 370 – 71 n 113.    
35 See GRUNER, supra note 20, at § 5.027H; James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret 
Constitutional Right, LITIG., SUMMER 1996, at 6.  
36 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1302; GRUNER, supra note 20, at § 5.027H. 
37 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1302; F. Joseph Warin & Michael D. Bopp, Corporations, Criminal 
Contempt and the Constitution:  Do Corporations Have a Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal 
Contempt Actions and, if So, Under What Circumstances?, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 1, 7 (noting that 
“petty/serious” distinction is what determines the corporation’s right to a jury trial).  One interesting area of 
debate is when a penalty would be considered sufficiently “petty” that the jury trial protection would not 
12
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D. Grand Jury. 
 
 Grand juries are common features of corporate prosecutions.38  They serve 
at least two functions.  First, they serve as a screen on weak cases and second, 
they serve as a powerful tool for gathering information about wrongdoing.39  The 
second function is not really associated with protecting the corporation, whereas 
the first is.40  However, one doubts that grand juries serve a serious screening 
function for corporate defendants.41  In the vast majority of cases the grand jury 
indicts the defendant.42   
 
 Civil cases do not have a direct analogue to grand juries.43  Nonetheless, 
given the fairly weak protection afforded by Grand Juries in criminal cases the 
lack of availability in civil cases probably does not harm defendants too much. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
apply.  See GRUNER, supra note 20, at § 5.027H; The courts have adopted different positions on this point.  In 
United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film  Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Circ. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1021 (1990), the court held that when prosecutors threatened fines above $100,000 then the offense would 
not be considered “petty” and would trigger the right to a jury trial. See id. at 658. When the threatened 
offense was below $100,000 then the right to a jury trial arose if the maximum fine would have a significant 
financial impact on the corporation.  See id. at 664; This is usually measured by reference to the fine’s 
relationship to the corporation’s financial resources. See id., at 664.  What percentage is significant “enough” 
is open to debate, but apparently anything below 15% will be considered not significant enough.  See Warin 
& Bopp, supra, at 22; GRUNER, supra note 20, at § 5.028. The fine’s relationship to the corporation’s ability to 
pay does seem to be an important factor in other cases too.  See United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 
F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1982); Musidor, B. V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1981). 
38 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1293. 
39 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1519.  
40 See id., at 1519 – 20.   This statement is a bit over-broad.  All else equal, more information should 
lead to more accurate decision making which should benefit innocent parties (i.e., here corporations). See 
generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis , 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 
(1994) For purposes of analytical simplicity I simply treat the information gathering function as something 
not necessarily designed to benefit defendants because it does not seem biased in their favor.  
41 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1519.  
42 See id., at 1519 n. 4. Further, the object of screening is to cull out potential false convictions. See id., 
at 1519.  The perception appears to be that in the corporate context false convictions are fairly uncommon in 
the first place and that there is little need to devise a screening mechanism to knock them out at an early 
stage.  See id., at 1520. 
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E. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search & Seizure. 
 
 The fourth amendment applies to corporations in criminal proceedings 
and to corporations in civil proceedings when initiated by an administrative 
agency.44  However, the corporation receives lesser protection than individual 
defendants might.45  Thus, what might be considered a “reasonable” search for a 
corporate defendant might not be for an individual defendant. 46 The courts have 
stated that the reason for this difference is that in the context of individual 
defendants the fourth amendment protects against unnecessary invasions into 
the privacy of the individual and against the costs associated with an endless 
parade of searches.47  For corporations only the latter concern is really 
triggered.48  Consequently, the level of protection is lower than what would arise 




 The corporation does not have a right against self-incrimination in 
criminal or any other proceedings.50  The primary reason for this is that the 
privilege appears concerned with preventing coerced testimony.51  In this context 
coercion is usually taken to mean violent or psychological coercion – both of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
43 Although civil cases have discovery, that is more analogous to criminal discovery than to grand 
juries.  See id., at 1522 – 25.   
44 See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury:  Converging Streams of Civil and 
Compulsory Process, VAND. L.  REV. 573, 587 – 89  (1994) (discussing abilities of agencies to subpoena); 
Friedman, supra note 4, at 194 – 95 (discussing applicability of fourth amendment in criminal proceedings 
with corporate defendants); Developments, supra note 4, at 1286 (same).  
45 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1286; Henning, supra note 3, at 826. 
46 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1288; Friedman, supra note 3, at 192. 
47 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1288; Friedman, supra note 3, at 194.   
48 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1288; Friedman, supra note 3, at 192.  
49 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1286; Friedman, supra note 3, at 192.  
50 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1278; Friedman, supra note 3, at 193. 
51 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1278 n. 13 (stating purpose of self incrimination).  See also 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission , 378 U.S. 52, 55  (1964) (noting that self incrimination protects against “self-
accusation, perjury, [and] contempt”).  
14
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which do not apply to corporations per se.52  Consequently, courts have held that 
there is little need for this privilege in the corporate context.53  
 
 There are other protections that might apply to corporations, but they 
tend not to be different in civil and criminal cases or they are the same as for 
individual defendants. 54  Consequently, I do not discuss them any further.  To 
summarize I put the discussion of the last few paragraphs into the following 
Table.   
 
TABLE 1 





Criminal Civil Criminal Civil 
Standard of Proof Reasonable Doubt Preponderance Reasonable Doubt 
 
Preponderance 
Retrial Protection Double Jeopardy & 
Collateral Estoppel 
Res Judicata & 
Collateral Estoppel 
Double Jeopardy & 
Collateral Estoppel 
 
Res Judicata & 
Collateral Estoppel 
Jury Trial Yes No Yes 
 
No 





Weak Search & 
Seizure. 





Strong Search & 
Seizure. 









                                                                 
52 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1278.  
53 See id., at 1279. An interesting set of issues relates to what happens to corporate employees who 
are in charge of corporate documents.  See id. at 1281.  As a general matter, if they are not targets of criminal 
prosecution they cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination.  See id., at 1282. Also, there have been 
a series of cases that seem to suggest that business documents, whether held by a corporation or a corporate 
official, may not trigger the self-incrimination privilege – perhaps because of a lesser concern with violent 
coercion for business documents.  See id., at 1283. Further, even if a corporate official could claim the 
privilege the government could give the employee immunity and thereby compel production of information 
to use against others and the corporation. See id., at 1285 – 86 (noting that “the government can secure the 
documents simply by using a search warrant, from the perspective of the accused, a subpoena is both more 
dignified and less intrusive”). 
15
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 Quickly scanning this table raises the basic question examined in this 
paper: can the current treatment be justified on economic grounds?  The next few 
Parts address this question for the first four protections in Table 1, while the last 
two protections are addressed separately in Part VIII because they have more 
direct effects on the ability to generate evidence that require separate discussion. 
 
III. ERROR COST CONCERNS 
 
 To begin our analysis it is important to step back and ask what policy 
concerns are motivating these procedural protections.  After this we can ask how 
these concerns operate in the different contexts discussed above. 
 
 Procedural protections serve a number of related, yet distinct, functions. 
For example, they may help to reduce the costs associated with adjudicative 
error, the costs associated with improper government enforcement, address 
concerns with the government encroaching on liberty and privacy interests, and 
yet others.55  However, of these only the first two – reducing error costs and 
reducing improper enforcement costs – really apply in the corporate context.  
Corporations do not have the same liberty and privacy interests as individuals. 56 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
54 See id., at 1289. 
55 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95.  Reducing litigation costs may also be an important 
consideration in assessing procedural protections.  See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106 (1978) 
(Brennan J., dissenting); Posner, supra note 6.  I do not discuss them here because a thorough treatment 
would require a separate paper.  A more complete analysis of litigation costs would look at feedback effects 
as well.  For example, stronger protections lead to fewer convictions (and cases) and more guilty people 
going free.  This worsens deterrence and should induce more wrongdoing which may generate more cases 
(or higher sanctions, but sanctions may have an upper limit).  On the other hand, weaker protections lead to 
more convictions (i.e., more cases) and potentially more deterrence and hence less wrongdoing which leads 
to less cases.  Whether weaker or stronger protections lead to less litigation costs is not unambiguously 
clear. [collecting cites]  Another reason I do not discuss litigation costs is because they may be related to 
error costs.  As errors increase (and deterrence decreases) we would expect to see more wrongdoing and 
more cases thereby increasing litigation costs. [collecting cites] Finally, most of the prior discussion of these 
procedural rules does not necessarily consider reduction of litigation costs as the primary motive.  See Peter 
Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP.  CT. REV. 81, 87 – 97 (arguing 
that this is not a very compelling justification).   [collecting cites] 
56 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95; [collect more cites – cases, …].   Corporations do not 
appear to have the same kind of autonomy concerns as individuals and hence do not really have the same 
16
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In this Part I discuss error costs and then, in Part IV, how they apply in the 
corporate sphere.  Similarly, Parts V and VI discuss improper enforcement cost 
concerns. 
 
The most common justification given for why criminal procedural 
protections are biased in favor of the defense is that the costs of false conviction 
errors are greater than the costs of false acquittal errors.57  In criminal cases with 
individual defendants a false conviction may result in the wrongful imposition of 
a prison sentence which involves substantial sanctioning costs.58  The sanctioning 
costs are high for a number of reasons including, that prisons are expensive to 
run and maintain, the person falsely convicted is deprived of his liberty as well 
as gainful employment for some time, and because a conviction (even a false one) 
imposes a difficult to remove stigma.59  Moreover, false convictions reduce the 
deterrent effect of the law and might dilute its moral force.60  False acquittals, on 
the other hand, do not impose sanctioning costs (because no sanction is 
imposed), but they do carry deterrence costs and costs associated with diluting 
the law’s moral force. 61   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
privacy and liberty interests.  Moreover, corporations cannot feel shame in the way individuals might.   
What impact corporate convictions may have on executives is not discussed in this paper.  See Khanna, 
Liability, supra note 1, at 1509 – 12.   
57 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE , COMMENTARIES *358; see also In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,  363 – 64,  372 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (1970).   
58 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 246. 
59 See id.; Winship, supra note 57.  
60 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 246; Winship, supra note 57.   
61 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 12; Winship, supra note 57.  On deterrence cost, see A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law , 5 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG’N 99 (1989).  A false conviction “lowers the incentive to obey the law because [the defendant] will face 
liability even if he obeys, thereby reducing the benefit to him of obeying the law”.  Id., at 104.  False 
acquittals hamper deterrence by reducing the costs of engaging in harm causing behavior.  See id.  
Erroneous decisions may dilute the law’s moral force and impose disutility costs – the disutility 
people suffer when they realize that sometimes the guilty escape punishment and the innocent are wrongly 
punished. See Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of 
Punishments, 10 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 441, 455 (1997) (stating that “[p]eople are willing to obey the law 
themselves so long as they can reasonably assume that those who break the law will not be able to do so 
with impunity, that they will not get away with it."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).  These disutility costs are, however, rather difficult to measure. See Hylton & 
Khanna, supra note 5, at 47 – 51; Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt, Decision Theory and the Virtues of 
17
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If the costs of false convictions are higher than false acquittals, then we 
may want to have procedural protections more biased against false convictions, 
or simply biased in favor of the defense.62  The reasonable doubt standard 
appears to do just this.  Indeed, the US Supreme Court in In Re Winship 
suggested that the error cost account provided a good justification for why 
convictions in criminal cases must be obtained on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 63 
 
Might a similar error cost differential arise in civil cases?  In civil cases the 
sanctions are basically monetary (e.g., cash sanctions) and these do not involve 
many of the sanctioning costs associated with prison.64 The primary costs of a 
cash fine are the costs of transferring the cash from one party to another, which 
are not terribly large.65  Here the costs of false convictions (i.e., false findings of 
liability) and false acquittals are roughly similar. 66  Consequently, we might 
expect the procedural protections to be more evenly balanced.67   For example, 
the preponderance of evidence standard in civil cases seems to keep such an 
even balance.   
 
Of course, the error cost account is not without controversy.  Arguments 
have been made that it, by itself, does not explain too much of criminal 
procedure and that some procedures appear to have little effect on error rates. 68  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 135-36 (2002). For an important and more general discussion on proof 
standards see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073-74 (1968).   
62 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 246; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 2, 6 – 7 (describing the basic 
error cost rationale); Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1513.  Criminal procedural protections are directly 
biased against convictions and indirectly biased against false convictions (which are simply a subset of 
convictions).   
63 See Winship, supra note 57, at 363 – 64. 
64 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1497 – 98. 
65 See id. 
66 See id.  
67 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 604 – 05 
68 This is for two reasons.  First, it is not clear that all procedural protections reduce errors or reduce 
false convictions.  See, e.g., Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects Of Criminal Procedure On Crime Rates: 
18
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Nonetheless, my interest is not in debating the strength of the error cost account.  
Rather, I will assume that the error cost account provides at least a partial 
explanation for our pro-defendant criminal procedures 69  and then ask how this 
account plays out in the context of corporate defendants.   
   
IV. ERROR COSTS AND THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT 
 
As a preliminary matter, corporations face essentially the same monetary 
sanctions in civil and criminal proceedings. 70   Corporations cannot be sent to jail 
and all the sanctions they may suffer (e.g., cash fines, loss of license, suspension) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mapping Out The Consequences Of the Exclusionary Rule , (Oct. 23, 1998) (unpublished manuscript available on 
file with authors) (finding total crime rates increased by 11 per cent after Miranda); Cassell, supra note 5, at 
451 (finding criminal suspects less likely to confess after Miranda); Donohue, supra note 5, at 1150. See also, 
Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the 
Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 443 (1999); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
119, 170-77 (1998). Cf. Daniel J. Seidman & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game 
Theoretical Analysis of The Fifth Amendment Privilege, 113 HARV. L. REV. 430, 498 – 502 (discussing how the 
right to silence might have desirable effects on benefiting the innocent). 
In other contexts it is not clear that procedural protections have clear or significant effects on error 
rates.  For example, double jeopardy in the US has asymmetric appeal rights (prosecution cannot appeal an 
acquittal, but defense can appeal convictions). See Kepner, supra note 23, at 105; Sanabria v. United States, 437 
U.S. 54, 64 (1978) (holding that erroneous legal rulings leading to acquittals were not appealable); Khanna, 
supra note 22, at 342 - 352. This rule appears to decrease false conviction errors, relative to symmetric appeal 
rights, by preventing the prosecution from taking correct trial court acquittals and turning them into false 
convictions through appeals and retrials.  Further, this rule appears to increase false acquittals, relative to 
symmetric appeal rights, by preventing the prosecution from appealing false acquittals at the trial level. 
There may, however, be offsetting effects in play.  See Khanna, supra note 22, at 360 – 88. Because 
the prosecution has only one shot at getting a conviction it has an incentive to spend more in that one shot 
(the initial trial ). See id. at 374 – 88.  This increased expenditure may lead, holding all else constant, to a rise 
in convictions (including potentially false convictions) in the initial trials relative to symmetric appeal rights.  
See id.  This makes the net effect on false convictions ambiguous.  See id.  Similar arguments operate in the 
false acquittals context suggesting that the effects are likely to be ambiguous there too. See id. at 383 – 84. 
Moreover, in countries where prosecutors can appeal we see very few appeals suggesting that the likely 
impact on error rates is not only ambiguous, but also likely to be quite small.  See id. at 344 (listing various 
countries where prosecutors can appeal).   
It is noteworthy that others have suggested that a number of procedural protections are unlikely to 
be correlated with guilt or innocence.  See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 46 (1997).  Moreover, empirical support for the error cost 
argument is wobbly.  See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 7 – 13 (discussing empirical strength of error 
cost account).  Finally, the history of this area suggests that error costs were not the sole factor motivating 
the development of certain procedural protections.  See e.g., KAMISAR, ET AL , supra note 6, at  114 – 127 (8th ed., 
1994); WAYNE R.  LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.  CRIMINAL LAW 97 - 100  (2d. ed); WAYNE R.  LAFAVE, JEROLD 
ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  25 – 39 (3rd ed., 2000); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 
(1970).  
69 See id.; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 2.  
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are available or could easily be made available in civil proceedings.71 Moreover, 
prior studies suggest that the reputational consequences for corporations appear 
to be fairly similar in criminal and civil proceedings, holding the type of 
wrongdoing constant.72  Consequently, the costs of false convictions and false 
acquittals for corporate defendants are fairly similar in criminal and civil cases 
because the sanctions in both types of proceedings are basically identical.73  This 
suggests little need, on error cost grounds, for stronger procedural protections 
for corporate defendants in criminal, as compared to civil, cases.    
 
However, that does not end the discussion.  It still leaves open the 
question of whether the procedural protections should vary for corporations 
based on the different kinds of monetary sanctions (e.g., cash fines, loss of 
license, reputational loss) regardless of whether they arise in criminal or civil 
cases.  This is because not all monetary sanctions have the same social costs.      
 
To elaborate on this I will consider three cases.  First, I discuss the social 
costs associated with using sanctions imposed by the law such as cash fines, loss 
of license and so forth.  Second, I discuss the social costs associated with the 
presence of sanctions imposed by society, such as stigma and reputational loss.  
Third, and finally, I discuss the potential for, and social costs associated with, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
70 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1497; Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and 
the Costs of Legal Controls , 93 YALE L. J. 857, 857 – 58 (1984). 
71 See Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for gross Violations of 
Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.  L. REV. 327, 327 (2001); Coffee, supra note 1; Stephen R. Gleisler, 
Commentary, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations of Federal Law , 51 ALA. L.  REV. 375, 384 (1999) 
(stating that “[a]lthough corporations cannot receive jail time, they can receive heavy fines and can even 
receive the corporate ‘death penalty,’ which involves divesture of all assets.”); Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, 
at 1497 – 99; F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Persecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for 
Corporate Defendants, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 121, 130-31 (1997) (noting that “[u]pon conviction, a corporation 
cannot be sentenced to jail, but only to pay restitution, fines and adopt measures aimed at enhancing 
internal controls to prevent and detect future wrongdoing.”). 
72 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing 
Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 761 – 63 (1993); Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1502 – 12.  But see 
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 838 – 39 (2000).  
73 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1513 – 17.   
20
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 29 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art29
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure:  
An Economic Analysis, Draft 
19 
 
over-deterrence.  In each case I consider what procedural protections, if any, may 
prove desirable.   
 
A. Legally Imposed Sanctions 
 
Sanctions imposed by the law encompass sanctions that simply transfer 
value (e.g., cash fines) and those that do more than simply transfer value (e.g., 
loss of license, debarment and suspension).74  These sanctions result in different 
kinds of social costs.  For example, the costs associated with a simple cash fine 
are essentially the costs of ascertaining the desirable amount of the sanction and 
the costs associated with collecting that amount.75   
 
On the other hand, the social costs associated with a loss of license 
sanction are larger and include ascertaining the appropriate sanction, enforcing 
it, and assessing whether denying (or revoking) a license will cost the 
corporation the appropriate amount.76  To divine the answer to this last question 
we need to have some sense of the corporation’s profits in the future, how much 
these profits would be diminished by the sanction, and then we need to discount 
back the lost profits to place them in present value terms.77  None of these 
matters are easy to compute and are likely to generate costs.  One thus expects 
the social costs to be higher for sanctions that do more than transfer value. 
 
 In light of this, one might consider some adjustment to the procedural 
protections to bias the error rate against bearing these costly sanctions.78  For 
                                                                 
74 See id., at 1497 – 98; Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the 
Basket?, 44 CATH. U.  L. REV. 363 (1995).   
75 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1497 – 98.  
76 See id.  
77 See id., at 1498. 
78 Further, the parties do not fully internalize these increased costs because some portion of these 
costs are borne by the courts and judicial process. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the 
Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577 – 79 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).   
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example, procedures that reduce the false conviction rate even if they might 
increase the false acquittal rate.79  An example might be to increase the standard 
of proof above the preponderance standard, although not as high as the criminal 
standard.  This is because the social costs of sending someone erroneously to 
prison are probably greater than the social costs of wrongfully imposing a loss of 
license sanction.80  Moreover, for corporate defendants we are missing the liberty 
and privacy interests that buttress the reasonable doubt standard. 81   Thus, we 
may wish to reserve the criminal standard for cases where prison is an option 
and have a lesser standard for loss of license cases. 82 Perhaps an intermediate 
standard – between reasonable doubt and preponderance might be desirable.83  I 
discuss how we might do this later in Part VII.   
 
B. Socially Imposed Sanctions. 
 
 Sometimes society may also impose penalties on corporations that are 
distinct from the sanctions imposed by law.  Such sanctions are usually referred 
to as reputational sanctions and they often have social costs that exceed those 
associated with cash fines.84  In this section I define what reputational sanctions 
are, examine their costs, and argue that adjusting procedural protections may not 
be a desirable response to these costs. 
 
 As a preliminary matter, reputational sanctions presume the corporation 
has a good reputation in the first place.85  Normally reputations are built by the 
                                                                 
79 Of course, one could increase the overall accuracy of the adjudicative process which would 
reduce both kinds of errors.  For simplicity I do not discuss this option in this article, which is about 
procedural protections, rather than methods of enhancing accuracy.  For a greater discussion of accuracy see 
Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).   
80 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 12; David Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime , 42 J. 
LAW & ECON 121, 123 (1999).    
81 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95; [collect more cites – cases, …].      
82 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1515 – 16.  
83 See id., at 1516. 
84 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761 – 66.  
85 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761, 765 – 66; Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1500.  
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corporation investing something (e.g., assets, effort and time) in producing high 
quality goods or services, which then permits it to charge a supra-competitive 
price.86   The amount above the competitive price that a corporation can charge 
may be treated as the corporation’s return on its investment in building a good 
reputation. 87  If a corporation with a good reputation provides low quality, and 
this is revealed, then a reputational penalty may be imposed.  This could be 
reflected in a drop in the supra-competitive price a corporation charges its 
customers or in the reluctance of people to purchase products from the 
corporation.88  Thus, a reputational penalty operates by diminishing a 
corporation’s return on its investment in high quality (i.e., reducing the supra-
competitive price built on investments in reputation).  If someone else receives 
the corporation’s return (the ability to charge a supra-competitive price) then the 
social loss is simply the effort needed to transfer this return to someone else.  
However, if this return is not fully transferred to someone else then the amount 
that is not transferred is a social waste. 89  This latter account seems more 
plausible.90  Simply put, a cash fine is received by someone, but the value of the 
corporation’s reputation (the ability to price above competitive levels) is 
probably not received by anyone in its entirety.91   
                                                                 
86 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761 – 62. 
87 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1500; Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761, 763.  
88 See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 396 – 97 
(1990); Coffee, supra note 71, at 408; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 361-62 (1968); 
Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761, 763, 765 - 66 (discussing reputational penalties which become large for 
companies involved in criminal proceedings).   
Corporations cannot feel shame and hence the focus on lost business opportunities.  Of course, 
managers can feel shame if they are convicted.  Whether managers can suffer a reputational loss if their 
corporation is convicted (a reputational rub-off) is a separate matter and is discussed in Khanna, Liability, 
supra note 1, at 1509 – 12.  My prior analysis suggests that the deterrence rationale for using reputational 
rub-off is very wobbly.  See id. 
89 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1500; Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 761, 763.  It is 
plausible that Y and Z may under some situations actually be able to recover the return on X’s investment or 
that X built a reputation based on false information or on less than the amount of investment needed to 
generate its supra-competitive pricing.  In these cases the social waste from reputational penalties is either 
muted or non-existent.  My thanks to Mitch Polinsky for suggesting this point.  
90 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1500 – 05. 
91 See id. at 1503.  Reputational penalties then operate by the corporation saying, in effect, that we 
are placing our investment (in the form of assets, time, effort) as a bond for high quality and if we fail to live 
up to that, and you discover it, then we will burn that investment. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 760 – 
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To illustrate consider the following example.  Assume that corporation X 
has a great reputation for high quality and it competes in a market that has two 
other corporations – Y and Z.  Further, assume that X charges $25 for its product 
while Y and Z charge only $20 each.  Also, X has invested $100,000 in developing 
this reputation.  One day it is revealed that X is no longer really producing such 
high quality.  The likely effect of this is that X may no longer be able to charge 
$25 for its product and that Y and Z may receive some of X’s customers. 92 Thus, 
the return on the $100,000 investment that X made is no longer present (i.e., the 
higher amount it charges per unit).  Unless Y and Z can charge a higher price for 
their product to recover the return on the $100,000 investment X made we have a 
diminution in social assets.   This can be considered a social waste – it would be 
better that someone else receives the return on the investment rather than it go to 
no one.93  Of course, it is plausible that some amount of this return may be 
recovered by Y and Z or by other parties, but the total amount is unlikely to be.94  
The amount not recovered is a social loss.  In such a situation one should 
consider whether using procedural protections may help to reduce these social 
costs.   
 
There are, however, reasons to be cautious about adjusting procedural 
protections based on likely reputational losses.  First, we may not be sure how 
large a reputational loss will be – this is something society (or the market for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
62. This is wasteful because it would be better, from society’s viewpoint, to hand the assets used to build the 
reputation over to someone rather than burn them.  See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1500 – 05. 
92 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 772 – 73. 
93 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1503. 
94 See discussion supra note 89. One might argue that customers gain when X suffers a reputational 
loss because customers no longer pay the higher price for a product that is not really high quality.  I am 
doubtful this captures the entire picture.  When X loses its reputation for high quality then its customers go 
back to paying the competitive price.  This is the price they would pay even if X had made no investment in 
quality in the first place.  This does not appear to be customers gaining the ability to receive a sub-
competitive price.   
24
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 29 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art29
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure:  
An Economic Analysis, Draft 
23 
 
corporation) essentially determines.95  Further, this is likely to be influenced in 
some measure by the efforts of the corporation’s public relations or marketing 
department.96  Given that we are unsure about the likely magnitude of the 
reputational penalty it may be unwise to set a higher standard of proof based on 
its fairly uncertain anticipated effect.   
 
Second, it is not so clear that heightening procedural safeguards will have 
much effect.  Studies suggest that most of the reputational loss suffered by a 
corporation occurs upon the initial announcement of investigation and generally 
before any verdict in a trial.97  Sometimes simply the announcement of the 
investigation or the filing of charges can impose the largest reputational loss.98   
Consequently, one probably does not reduce the magnitude or likelihood of 
reputational losses all that much by tightening procedural safeguards that 
operate at the trial stage (as the bulk of procedural protections do).99  
 
Third, even if reputational penalties arise later at the trial stage they may 
create asymmetric stakes that would reduce the need for heightened 
protections.100   Defendants may sometimes have more to lose (reputation plus 
damages) than plaintiffs have to gain (largely damages).101  This is unlike the 
case with loss of license or punitive damages where defendant losses may be 
largely gains to the plaintiff.  When we have asymmetric stakes then this should 
                                                                 
95 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1503. 
96 See id. 
97 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 769 – 73. 
98 See id. 
99 Throughout the analysis I have assumed that there is only a scant possibility of bearing sanctions 
for falsely investigating or charging (as opposed to convicting) a corporation.  If such sanctions are a 
significant possibility then this point would become weaker. 
100 See Cindy R. Alexander, Penalties: Public and Private: A Conference Sponsored in Part by the John M. 
Olin Program in Law & Economics at the University of Chicago Law School and the George J. Stigler Center for the 
Study of the Economy and the State at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business: On the Nature of the 
Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 489 (1999).   
101 This assumes that reputational losses are not fully offset by gains to the plaintiffs.  If they were 
fully offset there would be no reason to adjust procedural safeguards on error cost grounds because the 
error costs of false convictions and false acquittals would be roughly the same as for cash fines.  
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induce the defendant to spend more to defend against the suit.102  The 
defendant’s increased expenditure should lead to a lower probability of success 
for the plaintiff, holding all else equal.103  This has effects that are analogous to a 
higher standard of proof – there is a lower probability of plaintiff success.104  
Thus, even when reputational penalties are socially more costly than cash fines 
there may be little need to adjust procedural protections.   
 
C. Over-deterrence Costs 
 
Over-deterrence may sometimes be a concern and could influence us in 
setting procedural protections.  For our purposes, over-deterrence refers to the 
defendants over-complying with the law out of a fear of suffering a large 
sanction (e.g., defensive medicine). 105  This is socially undesirable because over-
complying with the law suggests that too much is being spent on compliance 
from a societal perspective or alternatively that some products and services are 
not provided in the optimum amount because of a fear of liability. 106  This kind 
of over-deterrence can occur in a number of different situations and can be 
                                                                 
102 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation , 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
26 (1984) (showing how defendants are likely to offer more money to settle disputes when they stand to lose 
more than the plaintiff stands to gain); Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic Analysis of Collateral Estoppel, 11 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 47, 50-59 (1991) (arguing that a defendant facing many claims would invest heavily in the 
first litigation under very plausible assumptions).  Of course, there may be instances in which the plaintiff 
gains more than damages – some people may praise or esteem a plaintiff for bringing certain suits.  See 
Richard H. McAdams, Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms: A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law , 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).  In these cases the asymmetric stakes problem is reduced. 
103 See Spurr, supra note 102; William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & 
ECON. 61, 63 – 71 (modeling the behavior of prosecutors and defendants considering their resources, 
likelihood of conviction, and sentence length).   
104 See Priest & Klein, supra note 102, at 24 – 29.  One difference between increasing procedural 
protections and asymmetric stakes is in who is expending greater resources.  For asymmetric stakes it is the 
defendant expending resources to avoid liability, whereas with procedural protections it is the plaintiff 
expending resources to impose liability.  Which approach may be better is a matter left to future research. 
105 See John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 977 – 79 (1984).  
106 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 105 , at 978.  A related sense in which over-deterrence can 
occur is if a legal decision outlaws an efficient arrangement (thereby causing social losses).  This is 
sometimes referred to as over-deterrence costs in antitrust.  See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust 
Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 684 – 90. 
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triggered by a number of different things.107  However, one fairly common 
trigger for over-deterrence is the presence of large penalties, especially under 
uncertain legal standards. 108 
 
Is there any reason to believe that corporate sanctions are very large?  
Here the evidence seems to suggest that corporate crime penalties are not very 
large.  Prior to 1991 both the magnitude of corporate crime penalties and their 
enforcement was quite paltry so that the threat of over-deterrence was somewhat 
muted.109  After 1991, corporate crime penalties did increase but even then the 
                                                                 
107 See id., at 977 – 79 (depicting a situation where a railroad reduces the speed of its trains below an 
optimal level in response to expected damage payments). 
108 See id., at 995.    
109 On penalty size see Cindy Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Marc Cohen, Regulating Corporate 
Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms , 42 J. LAW & ECON.  393, 395, 404  (1999).  
There is considerable evidence that corporate crime penalties are perceived to be generally lower than 
corporate civil sanctions.  See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Ideas & Trends:  Proposals for Punishment; The Case of the 
Criminal Corporation , N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, at 28; William Glaberson, S.E.C. Aide Assails Plan on Punishing 
Companies, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at D3, p. 6; Stephen Labaton, Corporate Penalty Plan Stirs Debate, N. Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1988, at D3, p. 1.   
The frequency of corporate crime enforcement is quite thin and usually against smaller firms.  See 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2001, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001 (last visited Mar. 21, 2003); Harry First, Criminal Antitrust 
Enforcement, Occasional Papers from the Center for Research in Crime and Justice, NYU School of Law, 1991 
(noting that many antitrust enforcement actions have been against smaller firms); Alexander, et al, supra, at 
403; Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules without…: Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 
WASH. L. U.  Q. 397, 399 – 400 (1993); Joe Davidson, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines Have Snagged Mostly Small 
Firms, 28 August 1995, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL , at B3 (stating that “[t[he commission said 97% of the 280 
firms sentenced under the guidelines since they took effect have been privately held or controlled by only a 
small group of shareholders”); Annie Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability, 39 AM. J. CRIM.  L. REV. 327, 338 
(2002)(noting that the majority of defendants sentenced are small, closely held organizations); Judge Diana 
E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines  for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 
1291 PLI/CORP 97, 113 (2002)(finding median number of employees at convicted corporations to be 20); Jed 
S. Rakoff, Avoiding Corporate Indictments Under New Sentencing Guidelines, BUS. CRIMES BULL: COMPLIANCE & 
LITIG., Feb. 1994, at 2 (stating that Commission data suggests that prosecutors are reluctant to indict public 
companies unless there are very serious offenses by high-level managers).   
Prior to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 it would appear that criminal fines 
represented about 15% of the harm caused when the corporation was held liable and the total sanction (all 
the monetary payouts such as the criminal fine, restitution, and civil payouts) was about 100% of the harm 
caused when the corporation was detected and held liable. See Alexander, et al, supra, at 409.  If the 
wrongdoing is the kind that is detected with a high probability then this suggests that the total sanction is 
roughly equal to total harm.  However, if the wrongdoing is the kind that is not easily detected (as most 
corporate wrongdoing is) then the total sanction will be substantially below the amount of total harm 
(which includes the harm when the corporation is detected and held liable and the harm committed when 
the corporation is not detected).  In either case it seems unlikely that there is real threat of over-deterrence. 
See id., at 409. 
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frequency of enforcement has not appeared to increase dramatically. 110   Thus, 
after 1991 there was a somewhat higher risk of over-deterrence from corporate 
crime penalties, although one doubts that risk is great. 
 
On the other hand, corporate civil sanctions have been and continue to be 
quite large and important.  The presence of greater than compensatory damages 
(e.g., treble and punitive damages) in corporate civil liability and the greater 
frequency of their imposition (relative to corporate crime penalties) suggests that 
the risk of over-deterrence is greater here than under corporate criminal 
liability.111 Moreover, sometimes treble and punitive damages are available 
under fairly uncertain legal standards.112   This suggests that there is likely to be 
a fear of over-deterrence when these kinds of sanctions are available.  In response 
one might consider enhancing the standard of proof to reduce the likelihood of 
these penalties being imposed.  For example, we might consider an intermediate 
standard of proof between the preponderance and reasonable doubt 
standards.113  Other measures might also be countenanced,114 but changes in the 
standard of proof are certainly an option. 
 
To summarize, our desire to increase procedural safeguards on error cost 
grounds for corporate defendants is likely to vary with the type of sanction 
rather than type of proceedings.  Thus, for cash fines simple civil protections are 
sufficient.  However, for other legally imposed sanctions that generate higher 
                                                                 
110 See US SENTENCING GUIDELINES Chapter 8 (1995).   
111 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)(treble damages available under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private 
Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17, 18-25 (development of treble damages in antitrust 
actions); Corporate and White Collar Crime: An Anthology 16 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995). 
112 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law , 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 220 (1991); Dorsey D. Ellias, Jr., Fainess and 
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.  REV. 1, 62 (1982); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, 
Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
113 See Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1514 – 1516.  The error cost analysis here would be the same 
if the government was the moving party or if a private litigant was the moving party. 
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social costs, such as loss of license, we may want to consider adjustments to the 
procedural safeguards (e.g., an intermediate standard of proof).  Similarly, we 
may at times want to consider adjustments to the procedural safeguards when 
the sanctions are large and could trigger over-deterrence concerns.  However, we 
probably do not want to adjust procedural safeguards in response to fears about 
the social costs associated with the imposition of reputational penalties.   
 
V.  IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS 
 
In addition to error costs, one might be concerned with the potential for 
litigation to be abusive, extortionary and frivolous.115 These kinds of improper 
enforcement can also generate large social costs and may be reduced through the 
use of procedural protections. 
 
Before engaging in a discussion on this a few words are in order.  
Abusive, frivolous, and extortionary enforcement can occur both when private 
parties initiate litigation and when government entities initiate litigation.  There 
are fairly direct methods of influencing the behavior of private litigants to deter 
them from bringing these kinds of suits – for example, increasing the costs for 
bringing frivolous or abusive litigation.  Because most private litigation against 
corporations seeks to obtain monetary recovery and most private litigants bear 
the costs of their litigation we can influence their behavior by having some effect 
either on the amount of recovery or by having some impact on litigation costs.116  
Thus, fee-shifting rules and penalties for frivolous litigation can help to reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
114 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 18 – 24; Cass & Hylton, supra note 106 (discussing use of 
intent to curtail improper enforcement concerns).  
115 See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Action from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary 
Judging, 2003 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1239, 1243-44 (2003); Richard H. Walker, et al., The New Securities Class Action: 
Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 644 – 45 (1997).  
116 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for 
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Shavell, supra 
note 34, at 384 – 86. 
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this kind of litigation in the private enforcement context.117  Such measures are 
not easily available for government enforcement because government enforcers 
are not as directly impacted by the litigation costs of enforcement and because 
government enforcers rarely receive direct financial gains from a favorable 
judgment.118  Thus, measures targeted to the amount of recovery and costs of 
litigation may be more useful in private enforcement regimes than in 
governmental enforcement.  Procedural protections, however, are more likely to 
matter in settings where these private litigation control techniques are less 
effective – such as government enforcement (criminal or civil).119  As procedural 
protections are the focus of this paper we shall primarily discuss how they may 
curtail improper enforcement in the context of government enforcement.  In the 
next few sections I discuss: how improper enforcement can occur in government 
enforcement against individual defendants, what are its costs, and how the 
procedural protections can help to constrain these costs.   
 
A. Forms of Improper Government Enforcement. 
 
 One of the basic concerns  animating the  legal  process  is constraining the  
                                                                 
117 This particular topic has spawned an awesome amount of discussion. See Lucian Ayre 
Bubchuck, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Law Suits, 
Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1996); Coffee, supra note 116; Virginia G. 
Maurer, et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
ECON. 272 (1999); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctions, Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis , 
82 GEO. L. J. 397 (1993); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way: Litigation 
Alternatives and Accommodations, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 871 (1989). 
118 Cf. Landes, supra note 103, at 64 (noting the effect of the fact that prosecutors do not pay for their 
prosecutions directly); Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
167, 175-76 (1985); Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  An Analysis of the Federalization of 
Drug Crimes, 2 J.L. & ECON. 259, 262-266 (2000).   
119 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 8 – 9.  Finally, a little more discussion on litigation control 
techniques may be appropriate.  There are many other methods we could use to reduce the social costs of 
certain kinds of litigation besides procedural protections – we could impose penalties on certain suits, deny 
standing, impose scienter requirements, and so forth.  I do not consider these other options here because 
they are outside the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, in a more global analysis one would want to examine 
these other methods of curtailing undesirable litigation and how they may also prove valuable in retarding 
improper enforcement concerns with governmental enforcement.  Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Toward a 
Functional Understanding of Standing, Discussion Paper No. 355, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & 
Business, Harvard Law School (2002), available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/.   
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discretion, or power, granted to government agents who enforce the law. 120  If 
this power is unfettered then it may be used by enforcers to benefit 
themselves.121  For example, unconstrained prosecutors might, in effect, sell their 
power to enforce the law to the highest bidder in exchange for either monetary 
gain or something else of value (e.g., political power and prestige, a chance to 
become an elected official). 122   
 
One way in which this could happen is if prosecutors, responding to the 
lobbying efforts or political clout of one group (group X), disproportionately 
pursued prosecutions against members of another group (group Y).123  Such a 
strategy may benefit group X by imposing costs on group Y and may also help 
group X by deflecting away some of the criminal enforcement that it would 
otherwise face.124 This is particularly a concern when prosecutors are elected as 
they may obtain the support of certain groups by offering to use the criminal 
process to benefit that group at the expense of other groups.125 For example, the 
Jim Crow South was replete with instances of prosecutors using the criminal law 
                                                                 
120 See e.g., KAMISAR, supra note 6, at 114 – 127; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.   CRIMINAL 
LAW 97  - 100 (2d. ed); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD ISRAEL & NANCY J.  KING,  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  25 – 39 (3rd 
ed., 2000); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). 
121 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 20 – 22.  I am not suggesting that all prosecutors do this, 
just that this is to some degree a concern with enforcement. 
122 See id., at 9 – 11.  These were some of the historical concerns motivating the development of 
some procedural protections. See id. 
123 See id., at 13 (giving an example of lobbying efforts). 
124 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 91-97 (1992); Dwight L. Greene, Symposium: Criminal 
Law, Criminal Justice and Race Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless 
Individualism in Bostick  v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1982 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L.  REV. 1413, 1498 (1989). 
125 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation and Enforcement Discretion , 
46 UCLA L.  REV. 757, 767 (1999); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 520 – 34 (2001)(discussing the incentives of various participants in the American Criminal Justice 
system); John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide 
Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L.  REV. 2571 (1997); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial 
and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 601, 648, n. 81 (1993) (noting that prosecutions are susceptible to political influence because most 
prosecutors are elected); Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the 
Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 777 (1991) (noting that prosecutors can attain 
status by utilizing class bias to pursue particular groups). 
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to coerce black citizens while rarely enforcing the law against white citizens.126 If 
the prosecutor is willing to behave in this manner then we would expect groups 
to lobby the prosecutor to secure such enforcement and to make it harder for 
others to impose costs on them through such enforcement.127  
 
 Another example of misuse of enforcement power is simple corruption. 128 
For example, a prosecutor who threatens to charge and prosecute someone 
unless that person pays the prosecutor (i.e., extortion) is one example of 
corruption.129  Also, consider a prosecutor or other enforcement official who is 
simply willing to take bribes not to enforce the criminal law.130  These kinds of 
improper enforcement, arising from the divergence of prosecutorial incentives 
from those of the social welfare maximizing ideal, 131  can lead to a series of social 
costs that require discussion.   
                                                                 
126 See EPSTEIN, supra note 124; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs , 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1839 
(1998) (discussing the Jim Crow South which involved selective law enforcement against African-Americans 
who committed crimes against other African-Americans).  See also William N. Eskridge, Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law , 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2447 (1997); 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of China’s One-Child Policy Undercuts Census , N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2000; 
Stuntz, supra, at 1795 (arguing that selective law enforcement drawn on racial lines will fail); David E. 
Bernstein, Lochner, Parity and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999). 
127 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229 - 46 (rev. ed. 1989); Shavell, supra note 78, at 612 n. 
46 (noting factors that influence prosecutors from state compensation to collective private efforts); Hylton & 
Khanna, supra note 5, at 10 – 11. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups 
for Political Influence, 98 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  371 (1983); Guang-Zhen Sun & Yew-Kwang Ng, 
The Effect of the Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation  (Draft)(on file with 
authors)(discussing how size and number of interest groups affects rent-dissipation). 
128 See Mehmet Bac, Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies, 12 J.L. ECON & ORG ’N. 277 
(1996)[hereinafter Corruption]; Mehmet Bac, The Scope, Timing and Type of Corruption, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
101, 104 (1998)[hereinafter Scope]; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of China’s One-Child Policy Undercuts 
Census , N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2000 (noting that local law enforcement officials have tried to enrich themselves 
with selective enforcement of one-child prohibitions at the expense of local farmers).  
129 See Bac, Corruption, supra note 128; Bac, Scope, supra note 128; Rosenthal, supra note 128.  
130 See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA.  
L. REV. 1695, 1701 (1997); Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions 5 - 
6 (Draft, 2000)(on file with author); Bac, Corruption, supra note 128; Bac, Scope, supra note 128, at 104. 
131 See generally Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent-Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING 
SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980).  The divergence may occur for a 
number of reasons including that prosecutors may value things that are not entirely congruent with social 
welfare.  Maximizing social welfare may involve, within a particular budget, minimizing false convictions 
and maximizing correct convictions. See Khanna, supra note 22, at 361 – 62.  See also Edward Glaeser & 
Andrei Schleifer, Incentives For Enforcement, Draft 2000; Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, 
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms , 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 801 (2000).  Prosecutors, on the other hand, may 
want career advancement, many convictions, big sentences, or many other things.  See Edward L. Glaeser, et 
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B. Costs Associated with Improper Government Enforcement. 
 
The direct costs of improper enforcement involve the costs associated with 
lobbying for targeted or selective enforcement, which are often socially wasteful.  
The social waste is comprised of some part of the lobbying efforts of the 
successful groups, the counter-lobbying efforts of the unsuccessful groups, and 
some part of government officials’ efforts in jockeying to obtain positions from 
which to extract rents as well as actually engaging in selective enforcement.132  
Similar costs arise in the context of simple corruption.133 
 
In addition to these direct costs, selective enforcement can influence 
deterrence too.  For example, imagine group X lobbies for little enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM.L. & ECON. REV. 259, 
262-266 (2000); Dirk G. Christensen, Comment, Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship: The Prosecutorial Dilemma in an 
Adversary System, 1981 DUKE L.J. 311, 325 (1981) (noting that prosecutors are usually rewarded on their 
effectiveness in obtaining convictions); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excess in the America; Criminal Trial, 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 441 (1992); William M. Landes, Economic Analysis of the Court, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 61 
(1971); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1477 – 78 (1993); 
Daniel C. Richman, Essay Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 939, 939 n. 93 (1997); Christensen, supra, at 321. 
132 See MUELLER, supra note 127, at 334 (citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  371, 373-374 (August 1983)); Hylton & 
Khanna, supra note 5, at 13 – 14.  See generally Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: 
Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 201- 04 (1991). Of course, lobbying for enforcement may at 
times produce socially desired results too, but there is little reason to believe that all lobbying will – some 
social waste will arise.  See Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent-Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING 
SOCIETY 97 – 112 (James M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980).     
Furthermore, the social waste of lobbying is likely to increase with certain factors.  For example, the 
amount of lobbying should tend to increase as it becomes easier to obtain governmental favors.  See 
MUELLER, supra note 127, at 334; Beermann, supra, at 183.  Moreover, as the stakes rise so should lobbying to 
capture those stakes.  See Daniel Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996); 
Arthur B. Laby, W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act: the Civil Money 
Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 50 (1994) (indicating that as the SEC’s stake in cases increases, more defendants 
are litigating and eventually the SEC will have to slow the growth in workload due to budgetary 
constraints); Spurr, supra note 102.   It is also plausible that as the number of groups, political or otherwise, 
increase in society we might see more lobbying groups and more wasteful spending. See also Sun & Ng, 
supra note 127 (Draft)(on file with authors). 
133 These costs include the time, effort and resources spent in bribery and the efforts of government 
official s in jockeying to benefit from bribes. See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 17; Gary S. Becker & 
George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); 
Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current 
Crusade Against Corruption , 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 877, 899 (2000).  
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against its own members, but more enforcement against members of group Y, 
with scant attention to whether the Ys are guilty.134  As there is less enforcement 
against Xs they face a lower expected sanction for their activities and hence 
would be under-deterred.135  Moreover, even the Ys would be under-deterred.  
This is because Ys are increasingly being punished regardless of whether they 
behaved legally or illegally.136 Simply put, the incentive to behave legally is 
reduced when the payoffs from acting legally and illegally get closer.  Deterrence 
for both X and Y then drops and is, thus, a concern with selective enforcement. 137    
 
In addition to this, selective enforcement may reduce the stigma 
associated with the criminal law and thereby harm deterrence by reducing the 
total sanction suffered by someone who is convicted.138  Moreover, selective 
                                                                 
134 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 29 n. 51; Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of 
Lawyers in Changing the Law , 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 822 (1994).   
135 See Polinsky & Shavell , supra note 61, at 104; Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and 
Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485 (2001).  
136 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 61, at 104 (noting that “A type II error (a truly innocent 
defendant is found liable) lowers the incentive to obey the law because he will face liability even if he obeys, 
thereby reducing the benefit to him of obeying the law”); Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and 
Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials , 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 319 (1994) (showing that if the 
jury is prejudiced against “habitual criminals,” they will punish them indiscriminately, so denying character 
evidence to the jury is good for deterrence). 
137 This analysis raises a fairly simple question – why would group X lobby for behavior that might 
reduce deterrence?  After all, that could lead to more crimes against Xs too.   Group X may lobby in this 
manner in some situations.  First, let us assume that group X prefers to control the behavior of its own 
members through its own social norms.  If so, then deterrence in group X, with respect to harms inflicted on 
other Xs, may not suffer because the norms may lead to compliance.  See Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: 
An Economic Model of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self Help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Janet’s 
Truck?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (1998).  Xs may continue to harm Ys, but that may not be a great concern for 
Xs.  Second, if X and Y are not living in the same locality, then X may chose to lobby enforcers to arrest all Ys 
entering their locality regardless of whether Y was behaving legally.  This is akin to racial profiling.  See, e.g., 
David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN.  L. REV. 
265, 271(1999)(describing two stories of individuals who were stopped in their vehicles, not because they 
behaved differently from those around them, but because they were African American); Tracy Meares, Social 
Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 203-4 (discussing how African American 
adults in poor neighborhoods with rampant drug problems are unable to instill law-abiding norms in 
children and because they are unable to move from these neighborhoods, they are more likely to call for 
legal distinctions between law-abiders and law-breakers); John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial 
Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); John J. Donohue III & Steven 
Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing, Arrest Patterns, and Crime (Draft 1998)(on file with author).  Such an 
approach could lead to a reduction in deterrence, in a fixed budget setting, amongst Ys, while imposing few 
costs on Xs.  This could result in a net benefit to Xs. See generally GORDON TULLOCK , THE ECONOMICS OF 
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING 11-27 (1989).   
138 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 16 – 17 (noting that the total sanction someone suffers is 
the sum of official sanctions and any reputational or stigmatic losses).  Stigma may be related to a belief that 
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enforcement may increase enforcement costs by making some members of 
society reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement thereby reducing the 
probability of conviction and hence the expected sanction wrongdoers face. 139   
 
C. Methods of Constraining Improper Government Enforcement. 
  
Given that improper enforcement generates significant costs it is 
important to consider methods of reducing these costs. 140 Pro-defendant 
procedural protections may do this by making it harder for the prosecutor and 
the lobbying party to find a mutually acceptable price for selectively enforcing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
a person convicted of a crime had done something meriting opprobrium and that this was shown in a fair 
trial.  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW.U. L. REV. 453, 469, 496 (Winter 
1997) (explaining how stigma can increase the costs of disobeying the law, but only if the community 
perceives the system as one that “never intentionally authorizes failures in administering liability and 
punishment . . .”); Janice Nadler, The Effects of Perceived Injustice on Deference to the Law, at 9-10, Draft 2000 
(on file with author).  If, however, lobbying leads to selective enforcement then one’s social circle could view 
a guilty verdict as being more indicative of the system’s bias than any behavior that really merited 
opprobrium.  See ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 97 – 100 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 357 – 58 (1997); Nadler, supra, at 10.  There is anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that criminal sub-cultures may form that might not consider a conviction very stigmatizing.  See 
Kahan, supra, at 357 (expressing how stigma has less effect in an inner-city neighborhood where some view 
convictions as a “badge of honor”); Richard Moran, Home Sweet Home:  Given a Choice, Many Convicts are Now 
Opting for Jail Instead of Probation:  Why?, BOSTON GLOBE, October 29, 2000, at E1.  If stigma drops, and there is 
no increase in the official sanction, then deterrence should weaken as the expected sanction has declined. See 
Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 16 – 17. 
139 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 17 – 18. People may be less inclined to assist with 
enforcers they consider to be biased.  Cf. Nadler, supra note 138, at 32 – 41.   If this happens then it is more 
difficult to obtain convictions and the probability of being punished diminishes which should weaken 
deterrence. See Kay B. Perry, Fighting Corruption At The Local Level: The Federal Government’s Reach Has Been 
Broadened, 64 MO. L. REV. 157, 162 (1999).  
140 Reducing these costs in the criminal enforcement context is roughly analogous to constraining 
agency costs in the corporate context. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986); WILLIAM A.  
KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS – AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS , AND CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 
2000)]. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation , 2 HARV. 
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115 (1997) (stating that “[a] prosecutor… is the agent of the people whom the office 
purports to protect.”); Caroline Heck Miller, Knowing the Danger from the Dance: When the Prosecutor is 
Punished for the Government’s Conduct, 29 STETSON L. REV. 69, 78 (1999) (noting that “[p]rosecutors are agents 
of the sovereign that employs them.”). 
However, the corporate context is subject to other factors that help constrain agency costs.  But the 
government sector is not subject to these other factors to a great degree.  For example, governments neither 
have the same risk of losing out to competitors that corporations do, nor do they issue stock as corporations 
do.  Not issuing stock means that governments do not suffer “decline in value” due to agency costs.  There 
are a host of other matters that make explicit constraints on selective enforcement in criminal enforcement 
more critical  than in the corporate context.   See CLARK, supra, Ch. 4; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law , 71 CALIF. 
L. REV. 795, 811 (1983) (noting devices that protect against the abuse of fiduciary powers). 
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the law. 141 Consider the case where prosecutors target innocents due to 
successful lobbying or corruption.  The procedural protections make going after 
the innocent more difficult and costly and thus make obtaining convictions 
against them less likely.142  If a prosecutor were to then adopt this strategy (i.e., 
target innocents) he will obtain few convictions and may well lose his job 
because high conviction rates are important for prosecutors.143  This means that 
the likely price demanded by a prosecutor for targeting innocents will be quite 
high relative to the price demanded when there are no protections. 144  Further, 
those who would lobby prosecutors might doubt the veracity of the prosecutor’s 
claim to selectively enforce, given the risk of job loss facing a prosecutor 
adopting this strategy. 145 Thus, in light of the dubious credibility of the 
prosecutor’s promise and the difficulty of successfully targeting innocents, the 
lobbyist’s willingness-to-pay should drop significantly when these procedural 
protections are in place. 146   
 
Similar arguments apply for cases where prosecutors might take bribes 
not to enforce the law against the guilty.147  A prosecutor who might consider 
taking such bribes will find it difficult to convict another person in place of the 
“truly” guilty person because the pro-defendant procedural protections make 
targeting innocents more difficult relative to where these protections are 
                                                                 
141 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 22.  
142 See id.  See Robinson & Daley, supra note 138, at 488, (explaining how the credibility of the 
system is reduced when someone is punished for something the community does not view as a crime) 
143 See discussion supra note 131. 
144 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 23.  I am not suggesting that absent these procedures 
prosecutors would be willing to accept bribes.  Rather that the presence of these protections reduces the 
number of prosecutors willing to accept bribes at the margin. 
145 See id.  
146 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, J. PUB. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2001); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment 
and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999). See also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 61, at 961 n. 637. 
On the social costs of corruption, see ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988); SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and 
Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE  1320 (1997); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
Corruption , 108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993).   
147 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 26 - 27. 
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absent.148  This means the prosecution will be unable to obtain a conviction for 
the crime if they take such a bribe.  This is a problem for prosecutors who value 
convictions (as most do for both personal and professional reasons) and it means 
promising not to enforce the law is not very credible given the difficulty of 
finding an alternative party to convict.149   
 
To get a better sense of how procedural protections can reduce improper 
enforcement costs we can consider the operation of the reasonable doubt rule 
and double jeopardy.  Both protections reduce improper enforcement costs by 
increasing the prosecutor’s costs of selective enforcement and by lowering the 
lobbyist’s gains from such enforcement. 150    
 
The reasonable doubt standard achieves this by reducing the likelihood of 
a conviction and increasing the evidentiary threshold needed for conviction.151  
However, even with a very low likelihood of success a prosecutor might still 
have an incentive to selectively enforce the law when successive actions against a 
particular defendant for the same wrong are possible.  For example, consider the 
case where the likelihood of conviction rises in the second trial because the 
prosecutor “learns from his mistakes” in the initial trial thereby increasing his 
chances of success in the second trial. 152  Thus, a prosecutor who believes the 
                                                                 
148 See id. 
149 Also, the target defendant (the person being extorted) would have a low willingness to pay 
because she considers her chances of being convicted, if she is innocent, to be quite low relative to where 
these protections are not in place.    
A couple of further points.  First, it may be easier to cover up taking a bribe for failing to pursue the 
guilty because prosecutors, due to enforcement constraints and prosecutorial discretion, may not pursue 
every case.  Thus, some bribes for inaction may not be easily noticed in the general cases prosecutors decide 
not to pursue.  On the other hand, bribes to target the innocent are more likely to be noticed and hence may 
be perceived as more difficult to accomplish.   
Second, the analysis in the text would be need to be adjusted if there were high stigma for being 
charged and little penalty for falsely charging someone. On stigma generally see Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and 
Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.  LAW & ECON. 519 (1996). 
150 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 23 - 24.  
151 See id., at 23.  
152 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1341 – 49.  Another case is where the probability of conviction 
is the same in every trial (no learning takes place).  Even here, if the prosecutor can bring an endless series of 
successive actions against a defendant then he will obtain a conviction at some point regardless of how low 
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first trial floundered because of a witness who came off as unreliable could 
increase his chances of victory in the next trial by coaching the witness.153  
Double jeopardy prohibits retrials and hence operates as a means to prevent 
prosecutors and other governmental actors from avoiding the constraints of the 
reasonable doubt standard by adopting a successive prosecution strategy.154   
 
This suggests that improper enforcement concerns are important in the 
context of procedural protections for individual defendants.  Let us now examine 
how these concerns play out in the corporate context.155  
 
VI. IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT COSTS AND THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that improper enforcement can occur 
against corporate defendants.  For purposes of discussion I provide a few 
examples put forward by others. 
 
A.  Examples of Improper Enforcement in the Corporate Sphere 
 
A fair amount of public choice literature has examined insider trading 
regulation and enforcement in the US and suggests that both the regulation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the likelihood of conviction is in any given trial.  See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 23 n. 53 (stating that 
“[s]uppose the probability of conviction in one trial is p.  If the prosecutor can bring an infinite number of 
successive actions, each with the same probability of conviction, the likelihood of eventual conviction is p + 
(1-p)p + (1-p)2p + … +  (1-p)Np, which approaches 1 as N approaches infinity.  For example, if p is 30% against 
an innocent individual then by the fourth trial the cumulative probability of conviction has risen to 
approximately 75%”). 
153 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1341 – 49. 
154 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 20 - 21.  
155 It is noteworthy that other methods could be used to address improper enforcement concerns. 
One is to place restrictions on the size of penalties or the process by which they are levied.  David Friedman 
has treated the size and process restrictions as “inefficient” punishments.  See David Friedman, Why Not 
Hang Them All: The Virtues Of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. POL. & ECON. 259, 262 - 63 (1999).  Another reason 
frequently given for certain procedural rules is to economize on administrative costs, which in this context 
refers more broadly to economizing on the resources (e.g., judicial, parties litigation) expended in 
adjudicating cases.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administraion, 
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 447 (1973).   This paper does not discuss the measures used to address this issue. 
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enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can be explained 
by the notion that certain regulations and enforcement are lobbied for 
aggressively by one industry group to the detriment of another.156  Some have 
argued that the one such example is the response to the Supreme Court’s insider 
trading decision in Chiarella.157  The Court held that for insider trading to 
generate an actionable claim under section 10(b) an insider must trade with 
someone to whom the insider owes a duty to disclose when trading, which is 
usually based on a relationship of trust and confidence.158  Corporate managers 
commonly have this duty to their shareholders and that duty will be violated 
when managers, without disclosure, rely on inside information to trade with 
their shareholders.159  Market insiders (e.g., investment analysts), however, do 
not generally have this duty to shareholders of the corporation.160   Following the 
Court’s decision in Chiarella we saw an increase in enforcement activity.161  This 
was partly the result of more active lobbying by market insiders in favor of such 
enforcement because these players were largely immune from regulation under 
Chiarella.162  Thus, lobbying for greater enforcement did not harm market 
insiders, but helped them reduce competition for valuable corporate information 
from corporate insiders (e.g., managers) who were subject to prohibitions on 
trading after Chiarella. 163 Moreover, there are discussions in the public choice 
literature suggesting that specific instances of enforcement were the result of 
lobbied for enforcement.164 
 
                                                                 
156 See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE RESTRUCTURING OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1995); Fischel & Sykes, supra 
note 132, David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider 
Trading Regulation, 30 J. L.  & ECON. 311, 323 (1987); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in 
the Economic Theory of Regulation , 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). 
157 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  
158 See id., at 228, 230.  
159 See id. 
160 See id., at 232 – 33. 
161 See Haddock & Macey, supra note 156, at 329 (citing Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider 
Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 74-83 (1980)). 
162 See id., at 329 – 30.  
163 See id., at 330.  
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 Outside of securities regulation, the antitrust area is replete with 
discussions of lobbied for enforcement.  There is considerable discussion in case 
law and commentary about the use of antitrust law (and lawsuits) as a method of 
squelching competition.165  The threat of large antitrust penalties could easily 
deter entry or force some competitors out of business or force them to become 
weaker competitors.166 
 
 In addition to selective enforcement, there is some suggestion that certain 
laws were enacted largely at the behest of certain industry groups that benefited 
from them.167  It thus seems that the prospect of selective regulation and 
enforcement in the corporate sphere is real.  The next issue is: how does the 
potential for improper enforcement in the corporate sphere compare to the 
potential in cases involving only individual defendants.   
 
B. Comparing Improper Enforcement Concerns for Corporate and Individual 
Defendants. 
 
Assessing the relative degree of improper enforcement concern in the 
contexts of individual and corporate defendants is difficult.  However, we can 
obtain some insights on it by reference to what we know about rent-seeking and 
lobbying activities.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
164 See FISCHEL, supra note 156. 
165 See Cass & Hylton, supra note 106.  
166 See id.; Harry First, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Occasional Papers from the Center for 
Research in Crime and Justice, NYU School of Law, 1991 (noting that many antitrust enforcement actions 
have been against smaller firms). 
167 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L.  REV. 211 
(1999).  See also Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest Group Competition and the Organization of 
Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees, 88 AM. ECON.  REV. 1163 (1998); 
Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormic, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 
J.L.ECON.  & ORG ’N 99, 100 – 06 (1982); Carlos D. Ramirez & Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Why Did the Clayton Act 
Pass? An Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis, Draft 2003 (on file with author); Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis , 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).  On the 
political economy of regulation see generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation , 19 J.L. 
& ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).  
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As a general matter rent-seeking activity (e.g., lobbying for enforcement 
and regulation) tends to increase as the stakes involved increase.168  This is not 
too surprising because as the stakes increase the returns to rent-seeking increase 
too.169   The monetary stakes involved with corporate defendants are usually 
greater than the monetary stakes involved with individual defendants.170  For 
example, the rent-seeker could impede competition from the corporate 
defendant, impose costs on it, provide the impetus for a slew of follow-on 
private civil suits, and so many other things.171  This is not as likely for most 
individual defendants.  Thus, we would expect more rent-seeking activities and 
lobbying of enforcement agents when dealing with corporate defendants. 172  
 
C. Improper Enforcement Concerns in Government Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
Against Corporate Defendants. 
 
The analysis regarding government enforcement has assumed until now 
that the degree of improper enforcement concern is the same across civil and 
criminal enforcement by the government.  There may, however, be reasons to 
question this assumption.  The federal government agency that enforces the 
criminal law (the Department of Justice (DoJ)) is different than the agencies that 
enforce the civil law, such as the SEC and the Environmental Protection Agency 
                                                                 
168 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 17 n. 51; Becker, supra note 127, at 373. 
169 See Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 17 n. 51; Becker, supra note 127, at 373.  
170 See GRUNER, supra note 20, § 1.9.2, at 52 – 55 (1994) (demonstrating that corporate fines are high 
and have risen). 
171 See Cass & Hylton, supra note 106, at 705-06 (explaining how false convictions may lead to an 
increase in firms using antitrust lawsuits as a competitive tool); Haddock & Macey, supra note 156, at 328 – 
33 (illustrating how market professionals, who are in direct competition with insiders, have a self-interest in 
aiding the SEC in identifying insider traders). 
172 However, sometimes the payoff from lobbying for enforcement may not be directly monetary.  
For example, some enforcement may be lobbied for not because it generates immediate monetary gain, but 
because it generates political points of some kind.  See e.g. Becker, supra note 127. How this plays out in the 
individual and corporate contexts is difficult to compare because the political points may vary dramatically 
with context.  
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(EPA).173  It is plausible that the improper enforcement potential might differ 
across these different agencies.  There are a number of reasons for this.   
 
First, civil agencies may enforce the law more frequently than the DoJ in 
the corporate arena.  Civil agencies tend to have more narrow mandates than the 
DoJ – for example, the SEC focuses only on securiti es markets, but the DoJ casts 
its net more broadly – and hence the civil agencies can focus their resources on 
fewer areas thereby increasing enforcement.174 Indeed, much of the criminal 
enforcement by the DoJ in the corporate arena comes from referrals by civil 
agencies.175  This suggests that corporate lobbying efforts are probably more 
focused on the arm of government with the more frequent and critical 
enforcement – the civil agencies.   
 
Second, the penalties against the corporation are roughly similar in civil 
and criminal cases and may even be larger in civil cases.176  This is yet another 
                                                                 
173 See Nancy K. Frank & Michael J. Lynch, Corporate Crime Corporate Violence: A Primer 26 – 27 
(1992).  I am referring to the enforcement of Federal Corporate Crime Legislation.  State corporate crime 
laws are enforced by state prosecutors.  See CORPORATE MISCONDUCT : THE LEGAL , SOCIETAL , AND 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 36 – 38 (Margaret P. Spencer & Ronald R. Sims eds., 1995). 
174 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG ’N 93, 99 – 108 (1992)[hereinafter Organizational]; Jonathan R. Macey, Separated 
Powers and Positive Political Theory:  The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L. J. 671 
(1992)[hereinafter Separated]. 
175 See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES (1978); Robert L. Rabin, Agency 
Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion , 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 
(1972). 
176 See Khanna, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 10 -11, 16 – 17 (noting the considerable evidence 
that corporate crime penalties are perceived to be generally lower than corporate civil sanctions).  For 
further evidence that appears supportive consider the Exxon Valdez Oil disaster.  It would appear that the 
civil sanction was much greater than the criminal one.  Exxon entered a criminal plea bargain wherein it 
received a $150 million fine (of which the court forgave $125 million).  See Consent Decree and Agreement at 
18-19, Clerk's Docket No. 46 in United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-0082-CV, and Clerk's Docket No. 26 in 
Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-0083-CV.   On the civil side, Exxon paid $900 million as well as the $2.1 
billion spent on the clean-up.  Id.  In addition, Exxon was adjudged to be liable for $5 billion in punitive 
damages (the largest punitive judgment ever visited on a U.S. corporation).  See Spillionaires, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, March 17, 1996, at B3, available at http://www.adn.com/evos/stories/EV402.html (last visited 
March 16, 2003).   
Note that even after the organizational sentencing guidelines (which increased criminal penalties) 
the criminal fine is still only a small portion of the total loss the corporation suffers from wrongdoing.  See 
Alexander, et al., supra note 109, at 409 – 10; Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 758 (noting that “[r]eputational 
cost… constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused or convicted of fraud.”). 
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reason for corporations to be more concerned with civil enforcement.  Indeed, for 
those interested in using the law enforcement process to benefit themselves it 
would make more sense to use the more frequent and larger penalty mechanism 
– government civil enforcement.    
 
Another consideration related to the tendency of agencies to focus on one 
area of regulation is that civil agencies may be more easily “captured” than the 
DoJ.  This is because the groups affected by the civil agency are small in number, 
have more of their livelihoods dependent on agency practices, and have quite 
frequent interactions with the agency.177  Smaller and more concentrated groups 
who depend on the decisions of the civil agency on a more regular basis have a 
much stronger incentive to lobby it for regulation and enforcement than to lobby 
a government agency that responds to many different interests and with whom 
they have less frequent contact, such as the DoJ.178 Agency capture is more likely 
with civil agencies, which is yet another reason to think that improper 
enforcement concerns are larger here than in the criminal context. 
 
This leads us towards having stronger protections when the government 
brings civil suits against corporations compared to when it brings criminal suits 
against corporations.  This particular result is counter-intuitive – we would 
expect the opposite to be true.   
 
VII. DESIGNING PROCEDURAL RULES FOR CORPORATIONS 
 
 Overall the key results of my analysis are that procedural protections for 
corporate defendants should vary based on the type of sanction and the moving 
party, rather than simply having stronger protections for corporate defendants 
                                                                 
177 See generally Macey, Organizational, supra note 174; Macey, Separated, supra note 174.  
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when charged with criminal wrongdoing.  This is for a number of reasons.  First, 
sanctioning costs are lower for corporate defendants than individual defendants 
because corporations cannot have the socially costly sanction of prison imposed 
on them.  This suggests weaker protections for corporate defendants than 
individual defendants on error cost grounds. However, the protections for 
corporate defendants should increase as the social costs associated with sanctions 
increases (e.g., as we use socially costly sanctions such a loss of license more 
often), although not to the extent of the reasonable doubt standard. This is 
because the sanctioning costs of prison are probably larger than the sanctioning 
costs associated with monetary penalties and because corporate defendants do 
not have significant liberty and privacy interests.  Second, improper enforcement 
costs are important in the corporate context.  Moreover, improper enforcement 
concerns for corporate defendants are probably larger in civil cases enforced by 
the government compared to criminal cases enforced by the government.   
 
 The implications of these findings for the design of procedural protections 
for corporate defendants are not very simple.  In order to simplify the analysis I 
will withhold discussion of whether to differentiate between government 
criminal and government civil proceedings until the end of the analysis. 
 
To start, let us consider the most basic case – a private litigant brings a 
civil suit for compensatory damages.  Here the standard of proof should be the 
civil standard (preponderance of evidence) because the sanctioning costs are 
those of a cash fine. 179 The concerns with improper enforcement can be 
addressed by relying on the standard techniques for controlling frivolous and 
abusive litigation in the civil side with private enforcement (e.g., fee-shifting).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
178 See Macey, Organizational, supra note 174; Macey, Separated, supra note 174; Haddock & Macey, 
supra note 156. 
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Our next case is when a private litigant brings a suit attempting to impose 
a loss of license type sanction or punitive damages.  Here the standard of proof 
should increase to something more than the civil standard, but less than the 
criminal standard because the social costs of loss of license and punitive damages 
are likely to be between the social costs of cash fines and jail time.  Let us call this 
intermediate standard of proof the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.180  
The improper enforcement concerns can be addressed with the standard 
techniques for controlling frivolous and abusive litigation in the civil side. 181  
 
Let us then examine what happens when the government brings a suit 
(criminal or civil) against a corporation to recover a cash fine.  I would suggest 
that the civil standard of proof should apply with something greater than the 
civil standard of retrial protection (i.e., closer to double jeopardy).  The civil 
standard of proof applies because the social costs of a cash fine are similar to 
those in standard civil proceedings initiated by a private litigant.  The reason for 
the “greater-than-civil-retrial” protection is that the government enforcement 
agent does not directly bear much of the cost of litigation as compared to a 
private litigant. 182 Moreover, the government enforcement agent is not as easily 
influenced as a private enforcer by fee-shifting and so forth.183  Consequently, the 
government agent may have stronger incentives to re-litigate a matter compared 
to private litigants.184  To curtail this incentive we may impose limits on the 
ability of the government to go after a defendant that are stronger than the limits 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
179 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 604 – 05. 
180 See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect 
Knowledge,  60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 385, 421; Khanna, Liability, supra note 1, at 1516 n. 210 (giving examples of states 
that use the clear and convincing standard before awarding punitive damages against corporations). 
181 It is noteworthy that the higher stakes in punitive damages cases can induce more rent-seeking 
litigation (see Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 17 n. 51; Becker, supra note 127, at 373 (as stakes increase so 
do rent-seeking incentives)) which provides further support for an intermediate standard of proof.  
182 See DRESSLER, supra note 8, §32.01D, Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple , 106 YALE 
L. J. 1807, 1815 (describing how, without the double jeopardy clause, the prosecution could keep retrying an 
individual until the defendant is, in part, financially worn down). 
183 Cf. Landes, supra note 103, at 64 (noting the effect of the fact that prosecutors do not pay for their 
prosecutions directly).   
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imposed under the standard civil law.185  In other words we could have the civil 
standard of proof plus something close to double jeopardy.186 
 
Our next case is when we are dealing with a government suit against a 
corporation seeking to impose a loss of license sanction (or punitive damages). 187  
Here I would suggest we should have a standard of proof higher than the 
preponderance standard to reflect the greater social costs with these sanctions 
(e.g, clear-and-convincing-evidence standard).188  Moreover, double jeopardy-
like protection is desired for the same reasons elaborated in the context of a 
government suit seeking a simple cash fine – government enforcers are not likely 
to be as influenced by civil law techniques for controlling frivolous or abusive 
litigation as private parties.  Thus, loss of license and punitive damages tend to 
have higher improper enforcement costs as well as higher sanctioning costs 
thereby justifying stronger procedural protections. 
 
Finally, let us consider if we should differentiate between government 
civil and criminal proceedings against corporations in terms of procedural 
protections due to the differing degree of improper enforcement concerns.  My 
analysis suggests that we should and this may require the development of some 
new procedural rules for administrative agencies.  However, this may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
184 Cf. id.; Glaeser et al., supra note 118; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 8 – 9.  
185 We could curtail this incentive by reducing the enforcement budget too, but that may have other 
effects as well if we face a relatively modest upper limit on sanction size.  See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. 
Rasmussen, Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001). 
186 I refer to this as “double jeopardy-like” because double jeopardy at present would permit 
retrials for technically different offenses based on the same set of facts.  See supra text accompanying notes 26 
to 34.  Even though this may not happen often I do not want to necessarily suggest this as the retrial 
standard of “sameness” I would use. 
187 See Andrew L. Sandler, Saul M. Pilchen, and Benjamin B. Klubes, The Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines: Increased Criminal Penalties for Corporations and the Implications for Corporate Self-Governance, in 
METHODS ON ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE  (2d ed. 1994). 
188 See in re Winship, supra note 57, at 371 (noting relationship between standard of proof and errors 
in convictions and acquittals); Hylton & Khanna, supra note 5, at 7 n. 28.  A higher standard of proof is 
desired not only because loss of license or punitive damages sanctions have higher social costs (e.g., 
sanctioning and over-deterrence costs) than a simple cash fine, but also because improper enforcement costs 
tend to increase with the stakes and as penalty magnitude increases so do the stakes. 
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ameliorated by the fact that courts can engage in judicial review of 
administrative agencies, whereas the degree of judicial review of the DoJ is much 
more limited.189  This may be enough additional protection for corporate 
defendants dealing with suits filed by government civil agencies.  This is, 
however, a very tentative suggestion.  It may well be the case that judicial review 
is simply not enough to curtail the potential for greater improper enforcement 
costs in government civil enforcement.  If so, then other measures may also need 
to be considered.   This could easily be the topic for a separate paper(s).   
Moreover, greater discussion of this issue is well merited, especially as these 
measures may even vary with the government civil agency (e.g., perhaps the SEC 
has greater potential for agency capture than the EPA or vice versa). 
  
Table 2 provides a summary of the suggested form of procedural 
protections for corporate defendants.  
 
TABLE 2 




































Judicial Review, and 
more? 
                                                                 
189 There is a tremendous amount of literature on judicial review.  To provide just a flavor see 
[collecting cites]; Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: 
Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There Will be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 371, 400 (2000); Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience , 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2003); Cass Sunstein, 
Law and Administration After Chevron , 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law , 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
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VIII. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AND FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
 
 In this Part I discuss the two protections that I have largely ignored in my 
analysis until now – the privilege against self-incrimination and the fourth 
amendment’s unreasonable search and seizure.   My first reason for deferring 
discussion of them is that both protections are applied with equal vigor in 
criminal and civil cases where the government is the moving party.190  Thus, the 
self-incrimination privilege is not available to corporations in any kind of 
proceedings and the fourth amendment’s protections are available in both kinds 
of proceedings when initiated by the government, but it provides lesser 
protection for corporate defendants compared to individual defendants.191  There 
is then little scope for comparing the criminal and civil rules with respect to 
corporate defendants. 
 
The other reason I have deferred discussion is that these two protections 
have a much more direct effect on the ability of the moving party to gather and 
present evidence against corporate defendants.192  Most evidence in corporate 
cases is documentary and produced by the corporation – a self-incrimination 
privilege would essentially deny the plaintiff and the decision-maker most of the 
relevant information.193  This is not true in the case of most individual 
defendants so the cost of the privilege is much higher in the corporate context.194  
                                                                 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 44 - 53. 
191 See id. 
192 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1276 (noting that “[b]ecause often the prohibited conduct 
leaves no physical trace . . . corporate documents may provide the only evidence that a crime has been 
committed”). 
193 See id.  
194 See id., at 1276, 1280 n. 29 (quoting United States v. White 322 U.S. 694 (1944)). 
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Moreover, a significant benefit of the privilege – avoidance of violent coercion to 
obtain confessions – is missing in the corporate context.195   
 
Similar arguments apply for the fourth amendment too.  The privacy 
benefit of it is largely missing in the corporate sphere and the impact on the 
ability to gather evidence is quite large.196  Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted 
that law enforcement would be severely compromised by any rule that protected 
all corporate evidence from the subpoena power.197  Moreover, the only real limit 
on the government’s power to gather evidence from the corporation is a concern 
with avoiding too much interference with business and the expense of 




 One of the fundamental questions of corporate liability is what kinds of 
procedural protections, if any, should corporate defendants receive?  Should 
these vary by the kind of proceedings, as they currently do, or is something else 
more appropriate?  This paper examines this question from an economic 
perspective. 
 
My analysis concludes that the concerns animating most procedural 
protections in the corporate context (e.g., reducing the costs of adjudicative 
                                                                 
195 See id., at 1278 – 79; Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 93.  Of course, to say there is no self-
incrimination privilege may be a bit of an exaggeration.  In certain states internal corporate memoranda on 
corporate compliance efforts (i.e., corporate self-policing) may be privileged so that it cannot be presented in 
court as evidence.  The ostensible advantage of this is that this may reduce corporate concerns that their 
efforts to self-police could come back and haunt them later in liability proceedings.  Making these 
memoranda privileged reduces this fear and increases the corporate incentive to self-police. See Jennifer 
Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). 
196 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 192 – 95 (noting that the privacy interests are weaker in the 
corporate sphere); Developments, supra note 4, at 1286 – 89 (same).  
197 See Developments, supra note 4, at 1287 – 88 (discussing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)). 
198 See id. 
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errors and abusive prosecutorial behavior) would require procedural protections 
for corporate defendants that differ depending on the identity of the moving 
party (e.g., government or private litigant), and the type of sanction the 
corporation is facing, but not on the type of proceedings (criminal or civil) against 
the corporation.  My analysis thus calls for a reorientation of procedural 
protections for corporate defendants along these lines rather than on the current 
criminal – civil dichotomy.  The implications of this reorientation are sketched in 
this paper and may, at times, suggest having stronger protections for corporations 
in some civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings. 
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